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THE_ SUPREME CoURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. By 
Robert H. Jackson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1955. Pp. 92. $2. 
In the months before his death in October 1954, Justice Robert H. 
Jackson prepared the drafts for a series of three lectures which he was to 
deliver at Harvard University. Although the Justice had not completed 
the final revision at the time of his death, the work was in substantially 
completed form and only technical corrections were made by the Justice's 
son and by his law clerk in the publication of the intended lectures. 
Justice Jackson's thesis is that the Supreme Court should adopt a more 
restricted role. He assails (p. 57) the "cult of libertarian judicial activists" 
who urge that the Court be the dominant factor in shaping the constitu-
tional practice of the future. (These lectures undoubtedly represent an 
attack upon the leading exponents of the "cult" on the Court, Justices 
Black and Douglas.) His argument (p. 24) centers on alleged "grave 
jurisdictional, procedural, and political shortcomings of the court." 
He lists in detail the limitations on the Court's power which are found 
in the Constitution. The dependence of the judiciary on the political, i.e., 
executive and legislative, branches of government is noted. Justices are 
nominated and confirmed by the political branches; the jurisdiction of the 
Court is largely under the control of Congress; and judges lack the power 
to enforce their mandates.1 In addition, the courts have little or no control 
over certain vital acts of government which involve the war power, foreign 
affairs, or the money, taxing, and spending power. The requirement that 
there be a "case or controversy" has not only precluded advisory opinions 
but has also blocked judicial settlement of many political questions.2 
1 The recent school segregation cases illustrate this limitation of judicial power. Brown 
v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753 (1955). 
2Yet he later notes (p. 56) that "questions which have deeply agitated the people, 
found their way to the Supreme Court in guise of private controversies between litigating 
parties." · 
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Non-constitutional, practical factors also impede the effectiveness of 
the Court. Because of the heavy work load, an average of only five min-
utes of group deliberation is spent on each item on the agenda during 
Saturday conferences. The pressure of time may create an attitude that 
discussion is futile. Such "working methods tend to cultivate a highly 
individualistic rather than a group viewpoint." (p. 16) As a result of the 
factor of delay in litigation, the damage may be done before the judicial 
remedy becomes available. Justice Jackson fails to note the self-imposed 
devices by which the Court circumscribes its potential power. For ex-
ample, the Court often seeks a technical, non-constitutional basis for a 
decision in order to avoid a perplexing constitutional issue.?· 
The Justice contends that the judiciary lacks the constitutional power 
, and the political support to maintain an equilibrium between the execu-
tive and legislative branches of government. Regardless of the opinions 
of the Court, the President will be a dominant force. And only public 
opinion, not judicial decision, can support the authority of Congress 
against encroachments by the executive branch. Congress remains pri-
marily dependent on the respect of the people for the maintenance of its 
power. 
Justice Jackson concludes (pp. 80-81) that the Court is helpless when 
faced with powerful political forces. 
". . . I know of no modem instance in which any judiciary has 
saved a whole people from the great currents of intolerance, passion, 
usurpation, and tyranny which have threatened liberty and free in-
stitutions. . . . In Germany ... courts decreed both the Nazi and the 
Communist parties to be ·illegal under German law. Those judg-
men~ fell on deaf ears and became dead letters because the political 
forces at the time were against them. . . . It is my belief that the at-
titude of a society and of its organized political forces, rather than its 
legal machinery, is the controlling force in the character of free institu-
tions." 
Based upon this bleak picture of the effectiveness of the Court, Justice 
Jackson makes specific recommendations. Of particular interest is his 
suggestion that diversity of citizenship be abolished as a basis for federal 
jurisdiction. He notes that Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins4 did not end the 
confusion, the conflict, or the shopping for forums. The decisions of 
lower state courts are controlling the judgments of fe~eral district courts, 
3 E.g., Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 75 S.Ct. 790 (1955). After being twice cleared 
by his agency's loyalty board, Peters was dismissed from government service when the 
Civil Service Commission's Loyalty Review Board held there was reasonable doubt as to 
his loyalty. The vital constitutional issues raised by Peters involved the denial of any 
opportunity to confront and to cross examine his secret accusers. The Court based its 
!fecision on the narrow, technical grounds that, under the relevant Executive Order, 
the Loyalty Review Board had no authority to review rulings favorable to employees 
or to adjudicate individual cases on its own motion. 
4 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938). 
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whereas such judgments might be overruled were they decided and ap-
pealed in the state system. Moreover, he deplores the use of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to set aside the acts of state courts, particularly in criminal 
matters. In his opinion, the danger of a centralized national police force 
and the transgressions of liberty by the all-powerful federal government 
are much more to be feared than the unconsidered judgments of state 
courts. 
Justice Jackson's preoccupation with the shortcomings of the Supreine 
Court may be derived from his earlier experience as a New Deal critic of 
the Court during the time of the Roosevelt proposal to reorganize the 
judiciary. His service as United States Chief of Counsel at the Nuremberg 
trials probably colored his views concerning the insufficiency of a judiciary 
in the face of powerful political movements. Whatever the explanation, 
these lectures present an overstatement of the case for a passive Supreme 
Court. Despite enforcement limitations, the recent school segregation 
cases5 indicate the powerful sociological influence which may be exerted 
by the judiciary. In an encounter with political forces generated by 
catastrophic events, the Justice's thesis as to the ineffectiveness of the 
judiciary may be correct. But in facing the danger of creeping authoritar-
ianism, the role of the Supreme Court, sustained by a public opinion which 
esteems the Court as an institution, should not be minimized. 
Howard M. Downs, S.Ed. 
G Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 755 (1955). 
